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Is Lawrence Libertarian?
Dale Carpenter*
Lawrence v. Texas' begins with "Liberty" and ends with
"freedom."2 For the first time in its history the Supreme Court
invalidated a law criminalizing sexual conduct. Add to that
sweeping statements in Lawrence celebrating individual
"autonomy."3 Consider too the Court's surprising revival of sub-
stantive due process, a doctrine entombed with musty tradi-
tions in liberty-denying decisions like Bowers v. Hardwick4 and
Washington v. Glucksberg.5 What is more, Lawrence is not your
father's substantive due process. The pre-Lawrence doctrine bi-
furcated the world into a large domain of almost unprotected
"liberty interests" and a very small and increasingly choosy
domain of strongly protected "fundamental rights." Lawrence
collapsed these claims into one, liberty, by avoiding the stan-
dard levels of scrutiny. And even that is not all it did. Lawrence
undermined the quaint and unprincipled distinction between
personal rights (some of which were protected) and economic
rights (not protected). That distinction had divided pre-New
Deal America from post-New Deal America, ratifying a dra-
matic expansion of government power at all levels and sharply
limiting judicial authority to exalt individual rights. Now all
"liberty," whether of the economic or personal sort, will be pro-
tected. Henceforth, the burden rests with the government to
justify its regulations or denials of liberty, not with individuals
to prove their liberties are "fundamental." The bureaucrats
with their stifling regulations, the lobbyists with their rent-
seeking ways, and the moralists with their nosy preferences
t Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. In preparing
this Article, I profited from the comments of Don Dripps, Brett McDonnell,
Michael Paulsen, and participants in this Symposium.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. Id. at 2475, 2484.
3. E.g., id. at 2475 ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485.
5. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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must pay heed. If the Court really means what it wrote, a liber-
tarian revolution is coming. An emboldened judiciary will lead
it.
That is one way to understand Lawrence. It is largely the
way Justice Scalia, who opposes the decision, understands it
(minus, of course, the tendentious criticism of pre-Lawrence
substantive due process). It is the way many libertarians, who
cheer the decision, understand it. Scalia urges this reading to
discredit the decision, to show how it is an act of judicial will,
not judgment, has no basis in our jurisprudence, and sets a
dangerous precedent for future judicial adventurism. Libertari-
ans, by contrast, urge this reading to expand the reach of Law-
rence beyond "gay rights" or even consensual adult sexual activ-
ity.
I will argue that the broad libertarian reading of Lawrence
misunderstands the decision. First, the libertarian reading is
not the best reading of the opinion itself, taken as a whole.
That is, the broad libertarian reading lacks internal persua-
siveness. Second, it is not the best reading of the opinion con-
sidered against the backdrop of the Court's substantive due
process decisions. It lacks doctrinal persuasiveness. Third, it is
not the best reading of the opinion in light of the Court's (and
the nation's) understanding of historical experience, especially
the lessons of the Lochner6 era and the New Deal. It lacks his-
torical persuasiveness. Finally, it is not normatively the best
reading, either from the vantage of democracy or from the van-
tage of individual rights. It lacks normative persuasiveness. The
irony, I will argue, is that the libertarian reading of Lawrence
actually weakens individual rights by throwing them together
onto an undifferentiated pile called "liberty," where all will get
some protection but none will get much. This is because, in the
hands of judges fearful of the "activist" label and properly reti-
cent about their role, weak empirical claims of third-party
harm will often trump liberty claims.
I will, instead, suggest a reading of Lawrence that notes its
new understanding of the role of gay people in American life
but nonetheless places the decision within a conservative tradi-
tion favoring incremental change over sudden and wholesale
ruptures with the past. Lawrence is no doubt a shock to those
pursuing an antihomosexual agenda.' To most Americans,
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Compare Justice Scalia's comment that the Court "has largely signed
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however, the decision is less an ipse dixit announcing radical
social change than it is a belated recognition of what they had
already learned about the humanity and dignity of gay people.
Rather than radically changing constitutional principle, the
Court has corrected its own erroneous understanding of the
facts that underlay its application of constitutional principle in
the past. Rather than leading the nation, the Court has caught
up to it.
Part I lays out the broad libertarian reading of Lawrence,
drawing on Scalia's dissent and on an article by a leading liber-
tarian scholar, Randy Barnett. Part II criticizes the broad liber-
tarian reading as lacking internal, doctrinal, historical, and
normative persuasiveness. Properly understood on its own
terms, and in its doctrinal, historical, and normative setting,
Lawrence is limited both in its departure from what preceded it
and in its immediate effects on many other controversies.
I. THE LIBERTARIAN READING OF LAWRENCE
Let's start with Justice Scalia's critique of the majority
opinion. While Scalia is certainly no advocate of judicially en-
forcing libertarian ideas as constitutional law, his dissent use-
fully presages the broad libertarian reading in key respects. He
offers an expansive reading of Lawrence, not to praise the deci-
sion, but to prepare the way for burying it.
First, Scalia notes that Lawrence does not actually say that
a fundamental right is in play. "Though there is discussion of
'fundamental proposition[s],' and 'fundamental decisions,'
Scalia writes, "nowhere does the Court's opinion declare that
homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due
Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the stan-
dard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if
homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."'8 Because the
Court does not explicitly say that a fundamental right is in-
volved, on Scalia's view, there must not be a fundamental right
involved.!
on to the so-called homosexual agenda." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2488 (citations omitted). As I note below, Scalia is right that the
Court finds no "fundamental right" to "homosexual sodomy" only because he
repeats the error of Hardwick in asking and answering the wrong question.
See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
9. Already, several courts have followed Scalia's conclusion that Law-
rence did not involve the exercise of a fundamental right. These courts have
1142 [Vol 88:1140
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Once this conclusion is reached, there are two directions
one might go to understand the holding of Lawrence. Either (1)
the Court is by default applying rational-basis scrutiny and is
therefore invalidating the law as failing to be rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose, or (2) it is abandoning the tradi-
tional tiers of scrutiny in its substantive due process analysis
and is replacing it with something new, perhaps a general lib-
erty presumption. Scalia believes the first has occurred. As we
shall see, Randy Barnett believes the second has occurred. Un-
der either reading, however, Lawrence places substantial and
new judicial restraints on the power of the state to curtail lib-
erty.
Second, Scalia specifies the far-reaching consequences of
the Court's decision in the area of sexual regulation. In his
view, the Court has adopted an "unheard-of form of rational-
basis review" 10 because it will no longer accept a moral justifi-
cation alone as a legitimate basis for law. The Court's opinion
"effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation."11 Under
the new regime, "criminal laws against fornication, bigamy,
adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity" will fail ra-
tional-basis review.'2 Even laws excluding gay couples from
marriage are invalid since Lawrence "dismantles the structure
been uniformly unfavorable to gay rights litigants post-Lawrence in the con-
text of marriage, Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003), a state ban on adoptions by gays, Lofton v. Kearney, No. 01-16723,
2004 WL 161275, at *9 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004), and a state law criminalizing
homosexual sex with a minor far more severely than heterosexual sex with a
minor, State v. Limon, No. 85,898, 2004 WL 177649, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan.
30, 2004). While I believe each of these courts has seriously misread Lawrence,
there is no doubt the Supreme Court in Lawrence left room for these results by
failing to state explicitly that it was dealing with the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right.
10. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 2495.
12. Id. This slippery slope appears, in one form or another, no fewer than
four times in Scalia's dissent. See id. (noting that Texas's interest in criminal-
izing homosexual sodomy is "the same interest furthered by criminal laws
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity");
id. at 2490 (listing laws against "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity");
id. at 2494 (listing laws against "prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscenity,
and child pornography"); id. at 2496 (listing laws against "adultery, fornica-
tion, and adult incest, and laws refusing to recognize homosexual marriage").
Only "adult incest" and "adultery" make the cut all four times. While "bestial-
ity" makes a surprisingly strong showing (two references), "masturbation" gets
a back of the hand (one reference). Laws against "coveting thy neighbor's wife"
go completely unmentioned.
2004] 1143
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of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be
made between heterosexual and homosexual unions."3
Third, Scalia implies the Court's libertarian opinion may
not be limited to laws regulating sexual activity. The Texas
sodomy law "undoubtedly imposes constraints on liberty," he
writes, adding, "So do laws prohibiting prostitution, recrea-
tional use of heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60
hours per week in a bakery. But there is no right to 'liberty'
under the Due Process Clause, though today's opinion repeat-
edly makes that claim." 4
Scalia thus sees potentially broad libertarian consequences
in the Court's opinion, consequences that stretch to commercial
sex, the regulation of illicit drugs, and economic regulation. The
reference to bakery hours, for example, is an unmistakable
warning that the Court's decision points back to the pre-New
Deal laissez-faire judicial activism of Lochner v. New York.15 In
the Lochner era, the Court relied on the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause to invalidate a host of state economic regu-
lations thought to trample the freedom of contract, including
laws setting minimum wages and maximum hours for employ-
ees of private businesses. 6 Greater judicial scrutiny of eco-
nomic regulations, abandoned since the New Deal, has long
been on the wish list of libertarian theorists.
17
I doubt Scalia truly believes the Court is about to embark
again on a crusade against laws setting maximum hours for
bakery employees. No doubt he would observe that the Court
will find some unprincipled way to cabin protected liberty to
those freedoms favored by "the lawyer class from which the
Court's Members are drawn."" But for Scalia, the logic of Law-
13. Id. at 2498. Notably, Scalia sees no conceivable rational basis for the
exclusion of gay couples from marriage other than morality. Id. He argues that
a justification frequently offered for the exclusion, that gay couples cannot
conceive children, will not work because sterile people and old people may
marry. Id. Scalia's conclusion is a striking acknowledgment of the thinness of
the arguments for excluding gay couples from marriage. His reasoning will
surely find its way into legal arguments for gay marriage.
14. Id. at 2491.
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 US. 525 (1923) (invalidating a
District of Columbia law setting minimum wages for women); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (invalidating a state law limiting bakery employees to sixty
hours per week).
17. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 141-43 (1992).
18. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1144 [Vol 88:1140
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rence ought to lead there. And in Scalia's view the decision will
certainly lead to much greater judicial supervision of democ-
ratic outcomes in many areas of life, all in the name of liberty.
Lawrence is "a massive disruption of the current social order"' 9
-a judge-made revolution-along libertarian lines.
What Scalia fears, Randy Barnett cheers. In an important
article published shortly after the decision, Barnett hails it as
"Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution."" For Barnett, the libertar-
ian character of Lawrence is demonstrated in several ways.
First, Barnett argues the opinion is about liberty, not pri-
vacy. As support for this view, he observes that "[1]iberty, not
privacy, pervades this opinion like none other, beginning with
the very first paragraph," in which Justice Kennedy mentions
liberty three times. 21 There are more examples of the emphasis
on liberty throughout the opinion, he argues, including impor-
tantly the Court's framing of the issue presented: "'We conclude
the case should be resolved by determining whether the peti-
tioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.' 22
Contrast this emphasis on liberty to the paucity of refer-
ences to the word "privacy," which appears just four times.2
The phrase "right of/to privacy" appears just three times, and
two of those are in quotes from an earlier opinion of the Court.24
The significance of this shift, which Barnett claims began in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,25 is that the Court is now protect-
ing a broad range of liberties, not just sexual privacy, from gov-
• • 26
ernment intrusion. More on this latter point below.
Second, in Barnett's view the Court has abandoned the
19. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Law-
rence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002-2003 21, 21 (James L.
Swanson ed., 2003) [hereinafter Barnett]. Barnett's analysis is fleshed out fur-
ther in his recently published book, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
21. Barnett, supra note 20, at 33.
22. Id. at 34. (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (Kennedy, J., majority
opinion)). The emphasis on liberty in the quote is Barnett's, not the Court's.
23. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (quoting the petition for certiorari); id. at
2477 (referring to "privacy" three times, twice in direct quotes from previous
decisions).
24. Barnett, supra note 20, at 39.
25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. Barnett, supra note 20, at 33.
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fundamental rights/liberty interests dichotomy of traditional
substantive due process analysis. Barnett, like Scalia, argues
the Court "never tries to justify the sexual liberty of same-sex
couples as a fundamental right."27 Scalia thinks this means the
Court must be employing rational-basis analysis, albeit an un-
precedented version of it, but Barnett draws a different conclu-
sion. The Court "never mentions any presumption to be ac-
corded the Texas statute,"28 notes Barnett, as it would if it were
using rational-basis analysis. So Barnett concludes the Court is
adopting a new methodology.29
Third, Barnett explains what he thinks must be the new
substantive due process methodology. It asks initially whether
a "liberty" is infringed by state regulation but is indifferent to
whether the liberty is "fundamental" or not.30 Excluded from
liberty is "wrongful behavior that violates the rights of others,"
which is not liberty but license.3' Once the Court determines
liberty is involved, "the onus then falls on the government to
justify the restriction of liberty."32 Barnett sums up the new ap-
proach this way: "Although he never acknowledges it, Justice
Kennedy is employing here what I have called a 'presumption
of liberty' that requires the government to justify its restric-
tions on liberty, instead of requiring the citizen to establish
that the liberty being exercised is somehow 'fundamental.' 33
The Court, according to Barnett, has thus adopted a "pre-
sumption of liberty" that Barnett himself has been urging in
his scholarship for almost a decade now. 34 To meet its burden,
the government must show its restriction on liberty is "neces-
sary and proper."35 A morals justification, standing alone, is not
enough to justify an intrusion on liberty.8 In Barnett's view,
this is why Texas lost.
Fourth, it is clear that Barnett thinks the new presump-
tion of liberty applies to economic liberty as well as to sexual
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 36.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Id. at 36.
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
93, 113-21 (1995).
35. Barnett, supra note 20, at 37.
36. Id. at 37-38.
1146 [Vol 88:1140
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and other personal liberties. The Court, he argues, has "finally
broken free of the post-New Deal constitutional tension be-
tween the 'presumption of constitutionality,' on the one hand,
and 'fundamental rights' on the other."37 According to Barnett,
the New Deal bargain between the Court and the nation, en-
shrined in United States v. Carolene Products Co.," was that
the Court would give up its efforts to limit economic regulation
by Congress and the states. But, the Court would intervene
under three narrow circumstances: (1) where a law is specifi-
cally prohibited by the Constitution, for example, by violating a
right found in the Bill of Rights; (2) where a law impedes the
proper functioning of the political process; and (3) where a law
results from prejudice against a "discrete and insular minor-
ity.
39
Now, under the broad libertarian reading of Lawrence, the
Court's supervision of democratic outcomes will extend well be-
yond these categories. For Barnett, the consequences are pro-
found.4" Yet, "for Lawrence v. Texas to be constitutionally revo-
lutionary, the Court's defense of liberty must not be limited to
sexual conduct."4 On this view, since the New Deal, the Court
has under-protected liberty by ignoring economic rights and
nontraditional personal rights. An example of the latter is the
liberty to use marijuana for medical reasons, a federal restric-
tion Barnett claims is now constitutionally dubious.42 For Bar-
nett, the selective judicial protection of liberty is a fatal politi-
cal error the Court is now poised to correct-if only it has the
courage to do so. This new approach has political advantages:
The more liberties [the Court] protects, the less ideological it will be
and the more widespread political support it will enjoy. Recognizing a
robust 'presumption of liberty' might also enable the Court to tran-
scend the trench warfare over judicial appointments. Both Left and
Right would then find their favored rights protected under the same
doctrine. When the Court plays favorites with liberty, as it has since
37. Id. at 21.
38. 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938).
39. Id. at 153 n.4.
40. Barnett, supra note 20, at 41. ("If the Court is serious in its ruling,
Justice Scalia is right to contend that the shift from privacy to liberty, and
away from the New Deal-induced tension between the presumption of consti-
tutionality and fundamental rights, 'will have far-reaching implications be-
yond [Lawrence].'" (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).
41. Barnett, supra note 20, at 41.
42. Id.
2004] 1147
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the New Deal, it loses rather than gains credibility with the public.43
If Scalia and Barnett are right, Lawrence is not simply the
gay revolution its critics fear. It is something much more
sweeping. It is a wholesale reordering of the balance of power
between the federal courts, on the one hand, and the states and
the other branches of the federal government, on the other. If
the broad libertarian reading is correct, Lawrence is a tectonic
shift the likes of which we have not seen in constitutional law
for almost seventy years.
II. THE UNLIBERTARIAN LAWRENCE
But the broad libertarian reading of Lawrence is not the
best understanding of the decision. Lawrence is many things,
some of them quite remarkable, unexpected, and even astonish-
ing. It is, for one thing, judicial decision as atonement. Having
gone out of its way to insult gay Americans in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,44 the Court in Lawrence went out of its way to assist gays
in the quest for full citizenship. Claims for the protection of gay
sexual relations that the Court found "at best, facetious"45 in
1986, triumphed resoundingly in 2003. Where the Hardwick
Court took a law that banned both homosexual and heterosex-
ual sodomy and used it to focus on homosexuals alone,46 the
Lawrence Court took a law that focused on homosexuals alone
and used it to strike down laws that banned both homosexual
and heterosexual sodomy. And, the Court did so on the ground
that striking down laws facially aimed at gays and straights
47
was necessary to protect gays.
Instead of relying on a narrow equal protection rationale to
strike down laws of the four states that targeted gay sex,48 the
Court dramatically and unexpectedly revived substantive due
process to strike down the laws of all thirteen states with sod-
omy laws. Against claims by Texas that gays were a class de-
fined by immoral conduct,4 9 the Court repeatedly affirmed the
dignity of gay lives. Where Hardwick conceived of gays as hav-
43. Id.
44. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485.
45. Id. at 194.
46. See id. at 190-92.
47. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488.
48. This is an approach that I urged in an amicus brief filed in Lawrence.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Republican Unity Coalition and the Honorable Alan
K. Simpson at 7-13, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
49. Respondent's Brief at 45-46, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
1148 [Vol 88:1140
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ing sex, Lawrence conceives of gays as having relationships.
Page after page of the majority decision is devoted to a harsh
critique of Hardwick for being wrong about history, wrong
about doctrine, wrong about precedent, and wrong about facts.5 °
It is an extended and heartfelt apology to gays for the harm
done.
But for all that, Lawrence is not broadly libertarian. It is
probably not even broadly liberty-affirming in matters sexual,
though that is a closer call. The state can probably continue to
prohibit prostitution and adult incest, for example, even when
these acts result from the fully consensual choices of adults. In
this section, I will argue the broad libertarian reading of Law-
rence is an over-reading of the decision, and implausible doctri-
nally, historically, and normatively.
A. INTERNAL IMPLAUSIBILITY
The problem with the broad libertarian reading of Law-
rence begins on the face of the opinion itself. This is not to say
there is nothing in the opinion to support a broad libertarian
reading. The opinion is so opaque that it bears a great many in-
terpretations. Parts of it, especially the opening Autonomy-and-
Transcendence paragraph,5' seem self-consciously written to be
history-making, to be read aloud in college courses on political
theory, to be revered in law schools in the way we have come to
revere the great Brandeis and Holmes free-speech opinions."
At moments like this, the Justices speak in their We-the-Court
voice.53 It is at once self-important and self-preservative. It in-
structs the nation how to think about grand concepts but leaves
maximum room for the Justices themselves to maneuver in the
50. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477-84.
51. According to the Court, "Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Lib-
erty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of
the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions." Id. at 2475.
52. These grandiloquent excursions are a favorite of Justice Kennedy, who
also apparently authored the Mystery-of-Life passage from Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, THE NEW
YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 87-88 (stating that "Kennedy... contributed the
lofty adages within the [Casey] opinion"). In Casey, the Court stated, "At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 505 U.S. at 851.
53. Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-16 (2001).
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future.54 So I do not argue that there is no basis whatsoever in
Lawrence for the broad libertarian reading. The argument here
is only that it is not the most persuasive reading of Lawrence,
taken as a whole. The errors in the broad libertarian reading
are several.
1. Fundamental Rights and Wrongs
A key part of the libertarian reading is to establish that
Lawrence failed to classify consensual, adult sexual conduct as
a fundamental right. Both Scalia and Barnett make this argu-
ment. If Lawrence has abandoned the fundamental right/liberty
interest dichotomy that has marked its substantive due process
cases (Barnett), or even if it has only jettisoned the morals
justification for the regulation of liberty interests (Scalia), the
field is open to many new rights claims.
a. Inferences from Silence
The main support for this conclusion is a conspicuous si-
lence in the opinion about just what kind of liberty the Court
thinks it is protecting. Lawrence contains no sentence akin to,
"Sodomy is a fundamental right," or even, "Private, consensual
sexual relations between adults are a fundamental right." Fur-
ther, in another conspicuous silence, the Court does not explic-
itly subject the law to strict scrutiny. So we find no sentence in
the opinion like this: "The Texas sodomy law is not necessary to
the achievement of a compelling state interest." Nor is any part
of that traditional test present. The Court does not tell us that
the Texas law is either too broad or too narrow in achieving its
objective. It does not say that Texas's interest in the statute is
not "compelling." So, the libertarian argument goes, the Court
must be doing something very new-and liberty-affirming-in
Lawrence.
But this implies too much from silence on these particular
questions of doctrine. First, there is a significant counter-
silence in the opinion. If the opinion is silent about strict scru-
tiny, it is also silent about rational-basis scrutiny. So we find
no sentence in the opinion like this: "The Texas sodomy law is
not rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state
interest." Nor is any part of that test present. The Court does
not tell us the Texas law is utterly unrelated to achieving its
objective, or that it suffers some other defect, like animus, that
54. Id.
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would make it invalid even on rational-basis review.6" It does
not declare categorically that Texas's interest in the statute is
not "legitimate." The closest it comes to this is its claim that
Texas has "no legitimate state interest which can justify its in-
trusion" into the.personal lives of the petitioners.56 This is an
ambiguous passage that, as we shall see, is best understood as
a comment only on the comparative weakness of the morality
claim against the strong interests of John Lawrence and Tyron
Garner. This undercuts Scalia's assumption that the Court is
applying rational-basis scrutiny at least as much as the omis-
sion of explicit strict-scrutiny analysis undercuts a conclusion
that a fundamental right is involved. Scalia's conclusion that
sodomy is not now a fundamental right seems more a hope
than an interpretation.
But does the omission of any explicit level of scrutiny prove
Barnett's claim that the Court is doing something new? No-
where does the Court actually say it is abandoning the familiar
substantive due process analysis. Such a major departure
ought to be announced by the Court, not interpolated by others.
Perhaps Lawrence is a first, tentative step in that direction, so
we shall have to wait to be sure. But past departures from, or
omissions of, familiar tests of constitutionality have not neces-
sarily augured the end of these tests. Casey did not apply stan-
dard strict-scrutiny analysis to what it had previously declared
was a fundamental right to abortion and, indeed, there are
numerous open-ended references to "liberty" in Casey.5 7 Yet, in
an opinion joined by Kennedy, the Court returned to the tradi-
tional analysis in Washington v. Glucksberg.58
There are yet more troubling silences for a broad libertar-
ian reading of Lawrence. There are no references in the opinion
to protecting economic liberties. There are no citations to
55. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-35 (1996). Though Romer is an
equal protection case, there is no reason to believe that its holding that ani-
mus-based classifications are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause would not also apply to animus-based denials of liberty under the Due
Process Clause. The defect in animus-based legislation is the same: a failure of
the political process to take serious, as opposed to mean-spirited and irra-
tional, account of the interests or classes being targeted.
56. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
57. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a juris-
prudence of doubt."); id. at 846 ("The controlling word in the cases before us is
'liberty."').
58. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (reaffirming the due process methodology of find-
ing fundamental rights only when rooted in history and the concept of ordered
liberty, then applying rational-basis scrutiny to uphold the state law).
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Lochner or to the many other old substantive due process cases
upholding economic liberty. Where the Court cites to Lochner-
era cases at all it is to those involving personal rights-child-
rearing and education-not economic or contract rights. 59 A
Court about to embark on a new and highly controversial ad-
venture into judicially mandated laissez-faire economics would
at least drop a hint. That hint would surely be stronger than
simply using the word "liberty" multiple times.
As for what might replace the tiers of scrutiny in a now-
abandoned standard due process analysis, the Court says not a
word. Nowhere does the Court declare a generalized "presump-
tion of liberty." Nor does it engage in a libertarian analysis
finding a "liberty," distinguishing it from "license," then shift-
ing the burden of persuasion of constitutionality to the state, a
burden that could be met only upon a finding that the law was
"necessary and proper" to the achievement of its objective.
Barnett acknowledges these omissions, but then excuses
them by saying that a bold announcement of the new liberty
presumption and attendant burden shifting might have "lost
votes.""° But, that is the point. It is very unlikely there are five
Justices (and I doubt there is even one) for a revolutionary
analysis presuming against the constitutionality of all legisla-
tion affecting some liberty, however unprecedented the protec-
tion of that liberty. Whatever its lineage and support in Ameri-
can legal history and doctrine, the broad libertarian framework
does not come from Lawrence.
b. The Level-of-Generality Problem
More importantly, the opinion is not all silence on the na-
ture or fundamentality of the right involved. Consider first the
nature of the right. It is true, as Scalia observes, the Court does
not declare a fundamental right to "homosexual sodomy."" But
that formulation only shows how mired Scalia is in the crabbed
worldview of Hardwick, one that "demean[s]" the lives of gay
62persons by reducing them to a specific sexual practice. 2
The Texas sodomy law, in the Court's view, sought "to con-
trol a personal relationship" between adults by prohibiting "the
59. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
60. Barnett, supra note 20, at 41.
61. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2478 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
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most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home." 3 It is the congruence of these
64three elements-a personal relationship between adults, ex-
pressed sexually, in private-that defines the important inter-
est involved. All three of these elements appear prominently
throughout the Court's opinion. A fourth element appears nec-
essary for judicial protection of the interest as a "fundamental"
one rooted in the nation's history and traditions. The Court will
guard the interest from state regulation where the nation has
already moved substantially toward protecting it through a
process of sustained, widespread critique and revision of laws
curtailing the claimed liberty.65 Revision, in the case of sodomy,
has taken the form of decriminalization and nonenforcement.6
The key insight of the Court here, an insight missed entirely by
Scalia, is that tradition evolves in light of lived experience. It is
not static.67
The right at stake, then, is not "a right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy." It is a right, already largely recognized in
American law, of adults to engage in a noncommercial, consen-
sual, sexual relationship in private, where their activity in-
volves no injury to a person or harm to an institution (like mar-
riage) the law protects. Lawrence has not found a "new" right,
as Scalia and other critics contend; it has corrected its misun-
derstanding and misapplication of an old one.
If that is correct, most of Scalia's slippery slope will either
not fall within the right articulated in Lawrence or will not oth-
erwise be protected judicially as fundamental. The right would
not include bestiality, which is not a relationship between adult
63. Id.
64. The Court frequently describes the importance of the conduct at issue
in terms of its potential relational consequences. Though sex is not always a
precursor to a deeper human connection, it is often an important step toward
it and part of it. "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring." Id.
65. Id. at 2478-82 (noting historical developments including: nonenforce-
ment of sodomy laws against private activity, lack of specification against gays
as a class, recommended decriminalization under the Model Penal Code and in
the Wolfenden Report, gradual decriminalization by state legislatures and ju-
dicial invalidations by state courts, decriminalization in other Western coun-
tries, and erosion of Hardwick in subsequent case law).
66. Id. at 2481 (noting state-by-state decriminalization).
67. This insight did not originate with Lawrence. In his influential sub-
stantive due process dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice
Harlan wrote that "tradition is a living thing." Id. at 542.
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persons, is not meaningfully consensual, and would not in any
event enjoy judicial protection as "fundamental." The right
would not protect obscenity or child pornography, which do not
involve a relationship between adults, and laws against which
have not already been largely dismantled or disregarded
through critique and revision. The right would not mandate the
recognition of same-sex marriage, which is a claim for public
recognition and public benefits. And while laws excluding gay
couples from marriage are subject to ongoing critique, only
modest and scattered inroads have so far been made against
the marriage exclusion. 68 The right would not extend to prosti-
tution, which does not involve a "personal" relationship, but a
commercial one, and is thus subject to rational regulation as
any commercial exchange would be. Additionally, prostitution
has been decriminalized by only one state,69 which is hardly
evidence of serious critique and revision. Adult incest, which
might otherwise fit the definition of the interest, would none-
theless not be protected judicially under the Due Process
Clause because it cannot claim support in the nation's devel-
oped tradition through the process of sustained, widespread cri-
tique and revision. 70 The only remaining destination down the
68. There may be other sound constitutional arguments for the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages. The most persuasive of these may be the Court's
recognition of a fundamental right to marry. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 284-86 (1978); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage are
currently undergoing a process of critique and, so far, partial revision. The re-
cent decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court extending the pro-
tections and benefits of marriage to gay couples, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the recognition of civil unions in Ver-
mont, the creation of a near-marriage equivalent in California, and the estab-
lishment of domestic partnerships in other states and municipalities and
among private employers, all suggest a strong cultural and legal movement in
the direction of recognizing gay relationships. These reforms are still in their
infancy. While the federal government has taken a small step toward recogniz-
ing same-sex couples by giving compensation to some gay partners of the vic-
tims of the September 11 terrorist attacks, see Jane Gross, U.S. Fund for
Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at Al,
federal policy overall remains hostile. See Defense of Marriage Act., Pub. L.
No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (defining marriage as a union between a man and a
woman and allowing states to choose if they wish to recognize another state's
recognition of same-sex marriage)). The movement is still too tentative and
modest to qualify same-sex marriage for fundamental-right status under a
Lawrence critique-and-revision analysis.
69. Nevada allows legal prostitution in limited areas of the state. NEV.
REV. STAT. 201.354 (2001).
70. For an excellent discussion of the likely constitutionality of most
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slope, laws against fornication (sex between unmarried people),
are indeed constitutionally suspect after Lawrence. If all these
laws, save fornication laws, are still constitutional after Law-
rence then the right it recognized hardly seems robustly liber-
tarian, even in the limited domain of consensual adult sex.
c. Fundamental Rights: Doctrine and the Dog That
Didn't Bark
Still, is the right protected in Lawrence a fundamental one,
or just a liberty interest? The better reading of Lawrence is that
the Court views the right as fundamental. The first reason to
conclude this is that the Court devotes a long opening section of
its opinion to the history of its privacy jurisprudence, including
the canonical cases now regarded as having involved the exer-
cise of fundamental rights.7' Griswold, says the Court, declared
a "right to privacy" that shielded "the marriage relation and theb,,72
protected space of the marital bedroom. Eisenstadt, the Court
argues, extended Griswold to protect a "right to make certain
decisions regarding sexual conduct ... beyond the marital rela-
tionship."3 Eisenstadt invalidated a state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people and so in-
volved a law infringing "fundamental human rights." 4 The
Court characterizes Roe v. Wade as recognizing a "right of a
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her
destiny... ."" Carey, for the Lawrence Court, confirmed that
the reasoning of Griswold (protecting a sexual relationship
within the privacy of the home) "could not be confined to the
prohibitions on adult incest after Lawrence, see Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest
Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2004). As for (hypothetical)
laws against masturbation, it is hard to see how a person has a right to pos-
sess masturbatory aids in the home, but cannot put them to their intended
use. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that private
possession of pornography is not a crime). As there are no laws against mas-
turbation in the United States, and none seem likely to be adopted in the fu-
ture, this is one destination on the slippery slope to which we already have
come.
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476-77 (2003). The canonical
cases of privacy jurisprudence include Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
73. Id. (discussing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454).
74. Id.
75. Id. (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. at 113).
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protection of rights of married adults."" Through this retelling,
Lawrence thus settles a debate among academics 77 about the
underlying meaning of its line of privacy decisions; they were,
broadly speaking, about a form of sexual autonomy.
It does not matter, for present purposes, whether the
Court's characterization of these cases is correct. The point is
that the Court describes the cases in a way that lines them up
very well with what it believes is at stake in Lawrence. The dis-
cussion places the claimed right in Lawrence squarely within
the context of the prior cases involving a fundamental liberty to
engage in private sexual conduct. Note how the description of
Griswold tracks the Court's understanding of the interest in-
volved in Lawrence, implicating both the relational and spatial
dimensions. Like Eisenstadt and Carey, Lawrence involves
"sexual conduct" outside the "marital relation."
Choosing one's own life path, free of state compulsion, is
important to this Court. As the state in Roe could not abridge a
woman's right to "make certain fundamental decisions affecting
her destiny,"78 the state in Lawrence could not "control [peti-
tioners'] destiny" by making their private lives criminal.79 The
parallels to the Court's fundamental-rights cases are unmis-
takable. Unless the Court means to argue that the interest in-
volved in Lawrence is like the fundamental rights involved in
its privacy cases, this entire section of the opinion is an unnec-
essary aside. That is not an impossibility, I suppose, but it is
surely an improbability.
d. The State's Interest
Further support for the fundamental-right interpretation
comes from the Court's consideration of the state interests in-
volved. Texas defended the law as a promotion of public moral-
ity.8 0 To overcome a fundamental right, the state interest would
need to be compelling. A mere "legitimate" interest would be
insufficient. What kind of state interest did the Court think it
76. Id. (discussing Carey, 431 U.S. at 678).
77. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 35-52 (2002); David B. Cruz, "The Second
Freedom Cases?" Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 328-53 (2002) (summarizing academic interpre-
tations of the privacy rights decisions).
78. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. at 113).
79. Id. at 2484.
80. Id. at 2486.
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was dealing with? The answer should help determine whether
the Court believes a scrutiny appropriate to a fundamental
right or to a mere liberty interest is applicable.
The Court comes closest to characterizing the morality in-
terest in two oblique passages. In one, the Court notes there
had been no showing that the state interest "is somehow more
legitimate or urgent" than had been shown in other western
countries rejecting sodomy laws."' In the second passage, the
Court concludes the Texas law "furthers no legitimate state in-
terest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and pri-
vate life of the individual. 82
Neither of these passages, in context, supports the view
that the Court is applying rational-basis scrutiny. Though the
Court speaks in terms of the "legitimacy" of the state's inter-
ests, a word usually reserved for rational-basis review, it does
not stop there. It does not say, for example, "the promotion of
morality is not a legitimate state interest." Standing alone, the
second passage could be understood two ways. One understand-
ing would be that the state's interest is not "legitimate" and so
is not sufficient to overcome even the nonfundamental right at
stake. The second understanding would be that the state's in-
terest, though legitimate, is not sufficient to overcome the im-
portant liberty infringed by the law.
The context suggests the second understanding is the bet-
ter one. The legitimacy of the interest seems comparative. That
is, the interest is measured against the strength of the right
claimed. If "the personal and private life of the individual" in-
volves the exercise of a fundamental right, as I argued above,
then the state's mere legitimate interest in regulating it for
morality's sake is of course insufficient.
The Court's other reference to the strength of the state's
morals justification comes in its adoption of part of Justice Ste-
vens's dissenting opinion in Hardwick.83 In Hardwick, Stevens
argued that "[olur prior cases"-meaning the Court's funda-
mental-rights cases-held that "the fact that a governing ma-
jority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law pro-
hibiting the practice."84 In context, it is clear that Stevens was
81. Id. at 2483.
82. Id. at 2484.
83. Id. ("Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been control-
ling in Bowers and should control here.").
84. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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arguing that a morality justification is an insufficient state in-
terest where a fundamental right is concerned. In adopting
Stevens's argument, the Court is saying no more than that.
If I am correct, then Scalia is wrong to say Lawrence de-
crees an end to all morals regulation. Instead, under my read-
ing, Lawrence is an application of the old rule that morals justi-
fications for regulation do not count as a state interest
sufficient to trump a fundamental right.
Consider too the public-health dog-of-an-argument that did
not bark.85 Many of the amicus briefs supporting Texas argued
that the state law rationally served the legitimate interest of
protecting public health by discouraging sexual practices,
namely anal and oral sex, that spread communicable diseases,
including HIV.8 6 Whether same-sex sodomy laws actually serve
public health objectives is empirically and logically very doubt-
ful. While the public-health objective is legitimate, same-sex
sodomy laws are only tenuously related to it, if at all. The laws
are over-inclusive in that they prohibit sex between two
women, yet lesbians are among the most STD-free segments of
the population."7 The laws are under-inclusive in that they do
not prohibit dangerous sexual practices between opposite-sex
couples. Further, because the laws are almost never enforced
against private sexual activity, it is doubtful that they deter
much sex, a point Texas implicitly conceded in its brief.8 8 In-
deed the laws may inhibit the reporting and treatment of com-
municable sexual diseases by criminalizing and stigmatizing
the conduct that leads to them, undermining public health
goals. 9
None of this should matter if the Court were applying ra-
tional-basis review, as Justice Scalia asserts. The law could
ing).
85. Eugene Volokh has made a similar argument for the fundamental-
right reading of Lawrence. See Eugene Volokh, Lawrence v. Texas and a Sex-
ual Autonomy Right, The Volokh Conspiracy, at http://volokh.com/2003-07_13
_volokharchive.html (July 17, 2003).
86. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Justice
at 19-20, Lawrence (No. 02-102); Brief of Amici Curiae Concerned Women for
America at 26-27, Lawrence (No. 02-102); Brief of Amici Curiae Pro Family
Law Center et al., at 19-22, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
87. See Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States,
275 JAMA 1354, 1355 (1996) (stating that lesbians are less likely to contract
syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia than heterosexual women and that trans-
mission of HIV between lesbians is believed to be rare).
88. Respondent's Brief at 48 n.31, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
89. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 164-65 (1992).
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have been sustained on a public-health rationale, imprecise as
the regulation might be. On rational-basis review, laws may be
under- or over-inclusive. It should make no difference that
Texas itself did not urge a public-health justification for the
law. Under rational-basis review, the Court hypothesizes possi-
ble justifications for a law.90
But where a fundamental right is at stake, and strict scru-
tiny applies, the Court neither accepts a loose means-ends fit
nor hypothesizes justifications the state does not advance. That
the Court did not accept the public-health argument-or even
bother to mention it 91-signals that it is dealing with something
more than a run-of-the-mill liberty interest drawing only ra-
tional-basis review.
If you still doubt this conclusion and suspect the Court was
applying rationality review to the Texas law, consider this sce-
nario. Suppose after Lawrence the Texas legislature held ex-
tensive hearings on the public-health threat represented by
sexually transmitted diseases, the homosexual contribution to
those diseases, and the corresponding desirability of reducing
the incidence of homosexual conduct. Suppose further that the
legislature took testimony from medical experts supporting
these views, with others opposed. Then suppose that the Texas
legislature passed "The Public Health Protection Act," criminal-
izing same-sex sodomy just as did in its Homosexual Conduct
Law. When the law is challenged, suppose this time Texas
squarely defends the law on the grounds that it is rationally re-
lated to the protection of public health, and that Lawrence is no
barrier because it did not consider this interest. Texas should
win. But is it really plausible to suppose the Court-confronted
squarely with this justification and the support for it-would
now uphold the law?
It is very hard to read the opinion as a whole and come to
that conclusion. The Court's hostility to the Texas law-evinced
in its concern about its intrusion on a "personal" and "private"
"relationship" and the stigmatizing effects of the law92-are too
pervasive and deep to think that the Court would accept an
empirically weak but rational justification. This intuition about
Lawrence suggests something more than rational-basis review
90. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 491 (2003).
91. Curiously, neither did Justice Scalia. It could be that he recognizes
that the argument is such a lemon that he could not bring himself to dignify it
with even a footnote.
92. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
20041 1159
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
is being applied.
2. Liberty v. Privacy
A key point for the broad libertarian reading is that Law-
rence is a not a "right to privacy" case, but a "right to liberty"
case. This argument expands the scope of Lawrence well be-
yond sexual freedom, to include other nontraditional personal
liberties and even economic liberties. The argument is largely
rhetorical, relying on the Court's frequent references to "lib-
erty" throughout the opinion while noting that references to
"privacy" or the "right to privacy" are few.93 The deeper mean-
ing of the Court's opinion, however, cannot be resolved by
counting words.
It is true that the Court grounds its opinion in the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. But that is nothing new
in itself. The modern Court has been doing that, with more less
emphasis, since Roe. Casey is notable for its invocations of lib-
erty.
However, grounding the result doctrinally in liberty makes
Lawrence no less a "privacy" opinion. It is not liberty generally
that is protected. It is the privacy component of the substantive
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause that drives the
opinion both rhetorically and substantively. Other aspects of
liberty may or may not be protected as fundamental, but pri-
vacy is.
Privacy, even more than liberty, pervades the opinion. The
emphasis is evident from the opening paragraph. What does
liberty protect against? "iU]nwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places."94 What substantive
rights are encompassed by liberty? "[F]reedom of thought, be-
lief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."95 Note that noth-
ing on that list refers to economic activity, or even to private
conduct in general. It is only certain intimate conduct-private
sexual conduct-that is protected.
The Court states the issue as involving whether John Law-
rence and Tyron Garner were free "to engage in the private
conduct" as part of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty.96 Next
the Court notes the criminal law reaches "the most private hu-
93. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 33-34.
94. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 2476 (emphasis added).
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man conduct" in "the most private of places."97 It declares that
the men were free "to enter upon this relationship in the con-
fines of their homes and their own private lives" without being
made criminals.98 In its discussion of the history of sodomy
laws, the Court repeatedly notes the lack of enforcement
against activity occurring "in private." The emerging tradition
recognized by the Court gives "substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex."99
These examples of the Court's emphasis on privacy could
be multiplied many times. In the penultimate paragraph, the
Court sums things up this way:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by mak-
ing their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter." The Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual."®
Yes, as the Court sees it, "liberty" is the textual basis for
the protection of privacy. It is also true that the Court's recent
substantive due process decisions, including Casey and Law-
rence, have tended to use the word "liberty" more than in the
past. But this is attributable, I suspect, to the Court's sensitiv-
ity to criticisms that its decisions in this area are activist ones
untethered to the text of the Constitution. "Liberty" appears in
the Constitution, so the Court has begun to use the word more
and more to describe what it is doing in its substantive due
process cases. I do not find the effort very persuasive as a tex-
tual matter, but the Court's effort is understandable.
The important thing to take away, for my present purpose,
is that the liberty protected in Lawrence is not a general right
to liberty. It is the privacy dimension of liberty that gets judi-
cial attention. The idea that the Court is doing something en-
tirely new with its substantive due process analysis-
protecting a generalized "liberty," discarding its familiar
framework for analyzing due process claims, inventing a new
97. Id. at 2478.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847 (1992)).
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burden-shifting analysis-is not justified on the face of the
opinion.
B. DOCTRINAL, HISTORICAL, AND NORMATIVE IMPLAUSIBILITY
The broad libertarian reading of Lawrence is also unattrac-
tive doctrinally, historically, and normatively.
1. Doctrinal Implausibility
The broad libertarian reading does not fit well with the
Court's other decisions in substantive due process cases. While
that jurisprudence has protected "a realm of personal lib-
erty,"'0 1 it has not been broadly libertarian, striking down state
economic regulation, disallowing all state morals regulation, or
shifting the burden to the state where any pedestrian "liberty"
is involved. The Court, even when vindicating rights, has been
careful to note the limits of the doctrine. Justice Harlan's clas-
sic dissent in Poe v. Ullman, laying out the tradition-based ap-
proach to determining the scope of substantive liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, recognized morality as a legitimate
concern of the state. 10 2 In Griswold, Justice Douglas's opinion
noted that the Court does not "sit as a super-legislature to de-
termine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."1 3 In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' the Court warned that sub-
stantive due process was a "treacherous field," given the ex-
perience of the Court with Lochner.'0 5 In Casey, too, which Bar-
nett proclaims the first liberty-emphasizing decision of the
modern age, ' the Court noted the errors of the Lochner era."'
Even in Roe, which stretched the outer limits of substantive
due process, the Court noted that the right of privacy is not
"absolute" and specifically rejected "an unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases,"0 " citing cases upholding man-
datory vaccination and sterilization laws.'O9
101. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
102. 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
104. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down zoning restric-
tion limiting single-home occupancy to traditional nuclear families).
105. Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
106. Barnett, supra note 20, at 33.
107. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (mandatory
1162 [Vol 88:1140
IS LAWRENCE LIBERTARIAN?
There is, to be sure, a serious question about whether Law-
rence is consistent with Glucksberg, which goes unmentioned in
the majority opinion. If Lawrence represents a departure from
the Glucksberg mode of substantive due process analysis, then
perhaps we are witnessing a libertarian rupture with the past.
In Glucksberg, the Court turned away a claimed fundamental
right to assisted suicide."0 For our purposes, there are three
important elements of the Glucksberg substantive due process
analysis. First, the Court found it significant that "assisted-
suicide bans are not innovations."' Instead, "they are long
standing expressions of the states' commitment to the protec-
tion and preservation of all human life.""' 2 Second, the Court
repeated its long standing definition of fundamental rights as
those that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,' 113 and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 1 14 Third,
it required a "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest."'11 This suggests a preference for describing the
claimed right at a fairly specific level of generality.
Lawrence can be squared with Glucksberg, though the
Court made no explicit attempt to do so. Unlike assisted-suicide
bans, bans on same-sex sexual activity are an innovation, a fact
the Lawrence Court noted when it observed that laws targeting
gay couples did not appear until the last third of the twentieth
century."6 Generally applicable sodomy laws, though long-
standing, have long been disregarded as constraints on private
activity, another point the Lawrence Court noted." '
On the protection of sodomy as part of the nation's history
and tradition, Lawrence relied on what it called "an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex."'1 8 This emerging awareness could be
vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization)).
110. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997).
111. Id. at 710.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
114. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
115. Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990)).
116. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2479-80 (2003).
117. Id. at 2479.
118. Id. at 2480.
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seen in several legal developments in the United States over
the prior half century, including the omission of crimes for con-
sensual sexual conduct in the 1955 Model Penal Code, the
gradual decriminalization of sodomy in the states beginning in
1961, the nonenforcement of sodomy laws in the minority of
states that retained them, and the Court's own decisions in Ca-
sey and Romer, which seriously eroded Hardwick as a prece-
dent."9 As for whether the petitioners' activity was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," the Court offered the observa-
tion that it "has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom" in many western nations.
1 20
There remains the Court's description of the asserted right
in Lawrence. Was it the "'careful description'" contemplated in
Glucksberg? To be sure, the Court describes the right at a
higher level of generality than it did in Hardwick. No longer is
the Court considering the existence of a fundamental "right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.""' That Hardwick characteriza-
tion of the asserted right, though narrow, is not "careful" be-
cause it trivializes the claim involved. Now the right at stake is
that of adults to have noncommercial, consensual sex with
other adults in private places like the home, where that sex
does not injure a person or harm an institution (like marriage)
that the state may constitutionally protect. 22 This is a broader
right than that conceived in Hardwick, to be sure, but it is
hardly unlimited. It allows plenty of room for state regulation
of consensual adult sexual activity involving, for example, pros-
titution and adultery. It is not a description of the right that a
broad libertarian philosophy would urge.
Another ill-fitting attribute of a broad libertarian reading
of Lawrence concerns the state's morality interest. The Court
has never before repudiated morality as a legitimate state in-
terest, a holding that the libertarian reading of Lawrence en-
tails. Instead, the protection of public morals has always been
thought within the state's police powers. There is a very good
and rather obvious reason for this: Morality is at the bottom of
all law. Consider: Why have a law against murder? Certainly to
prevent harm to people. But why is harm to people something
to be avoided? Because human life is valuable. But why is hu-
119. Id. at 2480-83.
120. Id. at 2483.
121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. at 2485.
122. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
1164 [Vol 88:1140
IS LAWRENCE LIBERTARIAN?
man life valuable?
I am not really sure how to answer this last question,
unless the answer is found in religious-moral precepts or in
what Justice Holmes called "can't helps," those things one can-
not help but believe to be true.123 Either way, they are moral in-
tuitions and principles. Every law, no matter how harm-based
we now think its justification to be, is only a few such "why"
questions away from being founded upon some moral principle
or intuition. What counts as "harm" that the state can by all
accounts legitimately prevent and punish are only those moral
intuitions and principles that are so widely shared that we no
longer think of them as involving morality at all. "Morality" has
today often come to stand for those intuitions and principles of
virtuous living that are seriously contested. The Due Process
Clause, as interpreted before Lawrence, allowed the contesta-
tion of morals provided the experiment did not infringe a fun-
damental right. The libertarian reading of Lawrence-under
which morals regulation is disallowed as applied to all "lib-
erty"-would have courts for the first time end this deference to
moral flux and experimentation. To read Lawrence in that way
would be to make it a dramatic rupture from the doctrine.
Nor have the substantive due process cases, prior to Law-
rence, placed the burden on the state to show that its regulation
of a liberty interest is "necessary and proper," as Barnett
claims Lawrence now requires. Neither the burden shift nor
the necessary-and-proper standard has appeared in any of the
Court's substantive due process cases, including Lawrence. The
broad libertarian reading would involve, in this sense, yet an-
other unannounced departure from all that has come before.
2. Historical Implausibility
The broad libertarian reading of Lawrence is also implau-
sible in light of the lessons of history, or at least the Court's
present understanding of those lessons. Foremost among those
lessons is the Court's confrontation with the New Deal in the
1930s, when it backed away from stringent review of economic
123. "[Als I have said before all I mean by truth is what I can't help think-
ing. But my can't helps are outside the scope of exhortation." Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Lewis Einstein (June 17, 1908), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL
OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 70 (Rich-
ard A. Posner ed., 1992).
124. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 37.
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regulation. Consider one view of why the Court changed course
at that point. Between Lochner and West Coast Hotel,
the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmis-
takable ... by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected in [the Lochner era] rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to
satisfy minimal levels of human welfare. The facts upon which the
earlier case [Lochner] had premised a constitutional resolution of so-
cial controversy had proved to be untrue, and history's demonstration
of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of con-
stitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. Of course, it
was true that the Court lost something by its misperception, or its
lack of prescience, and the Court-packing crisis only magnified the
loss; but the clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were
different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of
the old law.1"'
Debatable though it may be, 26 that is the current Court's
view of the lessons learned from the mistakes of Lochner.
Moreover, it comes straight from the liberty-focused plurality
opinion in Casey. It is very hard to imagine the Justices who
signed onto that opinion embracing a new Lochnerism dressed
up as a general liberty presumption.
A related point should be made here. Rather than repre-
senting a surreptitious return to Lochner, Lawrence is more
like a gay rights West Coast Hotel. Lawrence recognizes the
humanity of gays, understands that gays have relationships
and not just sex, and sympathetically compares those relation-
ships to the ones formed by straight people. That is a very dif-
ferent understanding of gays and gay life than the one that
prevailed in Hardwick. The Hardwick era, the Court now un-
derstands, rested on "fundamentally false factual assumptions"
about gay people. 127 One might put it this way: "The facts upon
which [Hardwick] had premised a constitutional resolution of
social controversy had proved to be untrue, and history's dem-
onstration of their untruth not only justified but required the
new choice of constitutional principle that [Lawrence] an-
nounced."2 ' This new, enlightened understanding of "the facts
125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (citation
omitted).
126. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 56-60, 62 n.317 (2003) (criticizing the approach of "the four current
liberal Justices" to understanding Lochner's legacy).
127. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (stating that the Lochner-era Courts re-
lied on "fundamentally false factual assumptions").
128. Cf. id. at 862.
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of [social] life were different from those previously assumed"
and "warranted the repudiation of the old law."'29
Thus, Lawrence represents a fundamental, but limited,
shift in the Court's understanding of the application of due
process principles. It is fundamental in that it recognizes the
relation of gay life to the long-protected and traditional rights
to family life and privacy, a connection Hardwick had summa-
rily dismissed. 3 ° It is limited, though, in that it betrays no shift
in the Court's understanding of the strength of other liberty
claims, especially economic liberties. History has moved, but it
has not disappeared. It still precludes the broad libertarian
project.
3. Normative Implausibility
Finally, the broad libertarian reading of Lawrence is nor-
matively unappealing, both because of its disruptive effects on
democracy and, counterintuitively, for its possible erosion of
liberty. For democratic decision making the consequences of the
broad libertarian reading could be profound. Much state and
federal regulation would become subject to a searching judicial
scrutiny, whereas now very little of it is. Judges might strike
down many more laws than they do now, raising the risk that
judges will impose their own biases in the name of the Consti-
tution. To that extent, the ability of the people to govern them-
selves through elected representatives would be diminished. At
the very least, Congress and state legislatures would be less
certain about which laws would pass the new constitutional
standard and which would not. Though the risk of judicial bias
and subjectivity are present in any approach to constitutional
law that includes the power of judicial review, the broad liber-
tarian reading would extend judicial scrutiny over a far broader
domain than what it covers now.
The broad libertarian reading, with its attendant invita-
tion to judicial hyperactivity, would invite yet more disruption.
Contrary to Barnett's prediction that broad judicial protection
for liberty would appease partisans on both sides by vindicating
their most cherished rights-economic on the one side and per-
sonal/sexual on the other"'-the opposite is likely to occur. Po-
129. Cf. id.
130. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986), overruled by Law-
rence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003).
131. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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litical partisans love not only their favored rights. They also
love their favored regulation. Conservatives will hardly be mol-
lified if religious and economic liberties are judicially protected
in a world where "fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest,
bestiality, and obscenity"132 prevail. Liberals will hardly be irnl-
lified if sexual and personal choices are protected in a world
where maximum-hours and minimum-wage laws are history.
The rancor over judicial appointments will not end. It will get
worse.
Paradoxically, broader protection for liberty might also un-
dermine the protection of the really important liberties. This is
because judges, concerned about criticism that they are too ac-
tivist, will develop methods of avoiding invalidation. This could
be accomplished by defining some conduct as "license," rather
than liberty, as Barnett's framework would allow.133 Or, even if
a liberty is involved, judges might tend to uphold the regulation
where the state can show some harm addressed by the law.
That much would be called for by libertarian theory, which
holds that the state may prohibit conduct that harms others.
3 4
Yet the state will almost always be able to show some harm;
Texas's defense of its sodomy law was unusual in that the state
offered no commonly recognized harm as a justification.
But the fact that some conduct can be said to cause harm
ought not always be sufficient to warrant its criminalization, at
least if the conduct involves the exercise of a fundamental lib-
erty. An invitation to judges to validate liberty-infringing laws
where some harm can be detected from the exercise of the lib-
erty would provide weak protection for important human free-
doms. As my colleague Don Dripps has pointed out:
First, the concept of harm is vague, vague enough that the proponents
of morals laws could frequently point to some immediate consequence
of private vice that can plausibly be characterized as harm. Second,
even if a narrow understanding of harm could be counted on, seem-
ingly private behavior very often initiates a causal sequence that ends
in harm, albeit the chain may be long and speculative. Third, because
the harm principle takes a categorical form, the principle allows the
imposition of criminal liability upon a showing of any harm, however
slight.... The second and third application problems together mean
that the harm principle would be at best a feeble check on a majority's
132. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
134. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 81-82 (Albury Castell ed., F.S. Crofts
& Co. 1947) (1859).
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inclination to punish nonconformity as vice.' 35
In short, harm can always be found. Liberties regarded as
fundamental-like the right to privacy or the freedom of
speech-are protected because they have some special value to
the person or to the functioning of the political system. They
are not protected because protecting them entails no cost. They
are not protected because the conduct they shield is thought to
cause no harm. Indeed, they are protected despite a frank ac-
knowledgment that harm may ensue.
A prominent example of this is the constitutional protec-
tion given to pornography that degrades women. Pornography
that depicts the subordination of women tends to perpetuate
their subordination. Women's lower status leads to lower pay,
domestic violence, and insult and rape in public spheres. Nev-
ertheless, the government may not restrict pornography on the
grounds that it perpetuates women's subordination. That is,
the liberty is protected despite the harm it is acknowledged to
136
cause.
A substantive due process analysis that allows judges sim-
ply to balance the exercise of liberty against the harm it causes
may result in less protection for liberty, especially compared to
the strict scrutiny given to restrictions on fundamental liber-
ties. Sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, introduce
collective stakes into private bedroom activity.' 31 If sexual lib-
erty is to be protected it must be protected despite the harm it
often causes third parties who are exposed to more disease and
to society as a whole, which must bear the cost of health care
and lower productivity.
CONCLUSION
Lawrence is probably not a broadly libertarian decision.
The Court repeatedly emphasized the privacy dimension of the
liberty at stake. There is no hint that the Court will return to
the days when it closely scrutinized state economic regulation
as an infringement on the "liberty" protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause. Indeed, the Court did not even broadly declare that
morality is no longer a permissible basis for law. By linking the
135. Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1998 at 3, 8 (footnote omitted).
136. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir.
1985).
137. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 259 (1999).
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right involved to the Court's own past recognition of fundamen-
tal privacy rights, the Court strongly suggested that it is deal-
ing with a special aspect of personal life that no ordinary state
interest can intrude upon. This makes Justice Scalia's fears-
and libertarians' hopes-of a newly activist judiciary seem
overblown.
